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KEY POINTS
 Lacunae and contradictions remain in the drafting of the relevant regulations, 
problems exacerbated by the UK’s implementation and case law.
 The use of remaining maturity as the basis for scoping bail-in raises a number of 
technical points pertaining to whether certain derivatives liabilities are excluded 
from bail-in.
 On balance it seems that porting will not constitute a Credit Event.
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‘Tis said they ate each other?  
The interaction between OTC  
clearing requirements and the BRRD
This article proposes that the current FSB consultation on continuity of market 
infrastructures for firms in resolution needs to consider how known difficulties 
with the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD) interact with cleared 
OTC derivatives.
INTRODUCTION
■As has previously been highlighted in this journal by the authors and others 
there remain several question marks about 
the precise operation of the Bank Recovery 
and Resolution Directive (BRRD) with 
respect to derivatives and their netting.  
The FSB’s recent consultation on its 
‘Guidance on Continuity of Access to 
Financial Market Infrastructures for a  
Firm in Resolution’ (December 2016) 
presents an opportunity to consider 
these problems in the context of Central 
Counterparties (CCPs) faced with the 
insolvency of a Clearing Member (CM) that 
is subject to resolution under the BRRD.
CCPs: OBLIGATIONS OF PAYMENT
The traditional swap relationship is 
bilateral between the parties economically 
invested in the swap. As swaps developed 
as a mainstay of financial practice swap 
brokers played a role in matching parties, 
but in many cases brokers only matched 
and did not enter into proprietary trades. 
Since the global financial crisis revealed 
significant stresses, particularly in relation 
to Credit Default Swaps, there were calls 
for reform and the innovation of CCPs was 
introduced as a G-20 commitment.1 Now, 
with the European Markets Infrastructure 
Regulation (EMIR),2 derivatives 
pertaining to several asset classes are 
required to be transacted through a CCP, 
the principal aim being to ensure a smooth 
continuation of market functioning in case 
of counterparty default. 
CCPs apply certain risk management 
methods to mitigate the fallout from 
default including the margining system, 
a recovery plan and default management 
processes. Moreover, CCPs will only 
allow institutions meeting strict entrance 
conditions to become clearing members. 
Let us consider the following example 
of how European-style OTC derivative 
clearing operates. For the sake of argument 
let us consider a fixed/floating interest 
rate swap, governed by the 2002 ISDA 
Master Agreement. Client wishes to fix an 
underlying interest rate payment obligation 
and so contacts Exchange Broker (EB),  
who also happens to be a Clearing 
Member of a CCP. EB locates a willing 
“counterparty” and affirms the trade 
“dropping it in” to the CCP. This is 
achieved by a largely automatic process:  
EB enters into a trade with the CCP 
which is back-to-back (b2b) with its own 
obligations to Client. The affirmation 
platform sends notices to another  
Clearing Member (CM1) and to the  
CCP seeking confirmation to set up  
b2b trades as follows: 
 a trade between Client and CM1 on the 
terms of the interest rate swap (ISDA/
FIA form); and 
 a trade between CM1 and CCP which 
is b2b the Client-CM1 trade subject to 
certain additional requirements the 
CCP may impose on the CM1. 
On acceptance the EB trades are 
cancelled and EB drops out of the picture, 
as its role was only introductory.
As a condition of acceptance CM1 is 
required to post initial margin (IM, being 
cash or qualifying securities) as collateral 
for this new risk. Through the term of the 
swap the CCP may seek variation margin 
(VM) as the mark-to-market value of the 
swap indicates greater risk, the VM being 
reduced in the converse case. With respect 
to both IM and VM the CM1 seeks matched 
collateralisation from Client.
The Client-side establishment of these 
trades is matched on the Counterparty side, 
with a Counterparty CM2 entering into b2b 
agreements with CCP. The net result should 
be that only Client and Counterparty 
should suffer contracted-for loss under the 
swap, with the intermediaries in the chain 
having zero economic exposure. It should 
be appreciated that the limited number of 
CMs means that CMs will have multiple 
exposures to CCPs, some of which could 
be Client-segregated, but which could be 
netted with swaps of similar types from 
multiple clients.
It should be appreciated that the limited number of 
Clearing Members (CM) means that CMs will have 
multiple exposures to CCPs ...
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EMIR-BRRD INTERACTION
The above clearing structure begs stress-
testing and we focus on one specific issue: 
the entry of CM1 into resolution under the 
BRRD. We assume for argument that CM1 
is subject to the UK’s implementation of 
the BRRD under various amendments to 
the Banking Act 2009, although the issues 
inhere in the BRRD itself. 
In our scenario CM1’s default is likely 
presaged by ratings downgrades which 
cause CCP to seek additional VM from 
CM1 and which CM1 may seek to pass on 
to Client depending on the terms of its 
relationship. We thus already have pre-
default losses being passed to Client.
On default the European CCP regime 
does heed the established FSB guidance that: 
“the entry into resolution of a [CM] or use 
of any resolution tool should not lead to an 
automatic termination of its participation 
in the [CCP]”. 
This is principally achieved by:
 A post default waterfall3 which taps 
inter alia:
 IM;
 CCP own-capital;
 The default fund set up for 
this event, and which can be 
replenished.
 Porting.4
Porting means that our CM1-Client trade 
will be novated to a non-defaulting back-up 
CM3, this trade backed by a new CM3-CCP 
trade on corresponding terms. In this way 
CM1 is cut out of the structure and the 
contagion risk that could issue from the bail-
in of its obligations to both CCP and Client. 
The risk with porting is macro-supervisory. 
It assumes that CM3 exists and is capable 
of accepting a port, an assumption that is 
questionable in cases of financial system 
failure in which all CMs are refusing to take 
on new risk. This links back to the question 
of the macro-supervisory mechanisms for 
containing the default of CM1 so that it 
does not spread contagion. We thus need to 
consider the effects of CM1’s resolution and 
specifically bail-in. 
BAIL-IN RISKS
EMIR and BRRD are designed to work 
together through the latter’s respect for 
EMIR’s twin approaches of appropriate 
loss-absorbency (IM, VM, Default Fund) and 
porting. Margin-backed liabilities of CM1 in 
particular should not be bailed-in. But what 
of CM1’s liabilities that it still owes to CCP 
whose value exceeds posted margin? It is 
difficult to assess how real the risk of under-
collateralisation is. When Lehman Bros. 
collapsed into insolvency, John McCormack, 
formally of CCP LCH (and now of Nomura), 
reports that only a third of Lehman’s margin 
was required to meet losses. Nevertheless the 
legal issue of whether the excess of liabilities 
may be bailed-in remains and it is not 
inconceivable that in an asset price spiral, the 
non-cash collateral in question may have been 
significantly written down. In such a scenario 
we could find that the resolution authority of 
CM1 is presented with the potential option of 
bailing in CM1’s net liabilities to CCP.
5
Whether this option is exercisable 
depends on whether the liabilities are 
nevertheless excluded from bail-in. The 
principal grounds for exclusion are:
 the maturity of the derivatives;6
 whether netting is to be respected;7 and
 whether the liabilities are secured.8 
Liabilities with a remaining maturity 
of less than seven days are out of scope of 
bail-in. It is worth noting that the clearing 
obligation extends to three day forwards 
and so it is evidently envisaged that a CM 
will have significant liabilities to CCP  
that cannot be bailed in. However, the 
carve-out does not turn on swap term 
but on remaining maturity. Thus a 50 
year fixed-to-float, with six days left to 
run should be exempted from bail-in; 
not a small matter if it is designed to 
be physically settled at term. Advisers 
should take care to ensure they apply this 
remaining maturity test and not confuse 
it with other aspects of EU derivatives 
regulation (and its UK counterpart)  
which turn on the seven day term 
distinction (see eg Annex 1 of MiFID,9 
on which EMIR relies for its definition  
of “derivative”).
The use of remaining maturity as the 
basis for scoping bail-in raises a number of 
technical points pertaining to the liabilities 
in question. If CM1 is in default and close-
out netting occurs then the net liability is: 
 (arguably) immediately created; and 
 immediately due and payable. 
The maturity is instantaneous; the 
debt is owing, payable and a claim may be 
brought. Should such a liability not then fall 
within the protection for liabilities of less 
than seven days? This is surely not the intent 
of the exclusion for exclusion of closed-
out liabilities renders it obsolete, but the 
drafting is unhelpful.
Turning to netting itself, the BRRD 
expressly provides that netting should be 
respected but it is well-known that the 
implementation of this requirement into UK 
law has been unsatisfactory and in need of 
remedy. In brief, the definition of “netting 
arrangements” which are to be protected is 
unusual and can be read as covering netting 
clauses that net existing liabilities, leaving 
any remaining liability owing. The ISDA 
and IFEMA methods of netting (correctly 
in our view) value outstanding trades, 
determine a net amount and then create a 
new debt in an amount equivalent to the 
net amount so determined. A fine point, 
but the English court’s troubled history in 
interpreting close-out netting would suggest 
that one cannot be altogether confident that 
common sense will prevail should the issue 
of whether CM-CCP netting arrangements 
are protected from UK bail-in be litigated.
Now, assuming the netting is protected, 
we come to the issue of security. Whether 
these liabilities be secured is, as we have 
argued elsewhere, not a straightforward 
question. Precisely because bail-in ought 
only to be considered where CM1’s 
collateral has failed to cover its net 
positions we must consider whether the 
liabilities eligible for bail-in are not secured. 
This could either be because: 
(i) the proprietary right to execute against 
the security has been exercised and 
there is no longer any security of which 
to speak, or (and the alternatives are  
not exclusive); 
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(ii) “secured liabilities” means only liabili-
ties to the extent they are secured, eg if 
100 is owing and the security realises 
90 then the remaining 10 is not a 
“secured liability”.  
In the UK it is arguable that option 
(ii) is applicable, for the relevant statutory 
provision expressly speaks of liabilities 
“so far as secured”.10 Thus the FSB should 
ensure that guidance to CCPs includes a 
recommendation to consider contractually 
agreed processes that protect against 
the limitations of the UK “secured 
liabilities” carve-out. Given that clearing 
houses reassess VM on a daily basis11 the 
probability of significant mismatch of 
collateral value and liabilities seems small, 
but in the case of non-cash-collateral in 
particular, a fall in the value of the securities 
offered leading to an intraday mismatch 
cannot be ruled out.
As discussed above, CM1’s provision of 
margin to CCP will have been undertaken 
on the basis that b2b margin was sought 
from Client. An interesting issue is what 
happens to the Client collateral on porting. 
The answer depends on whether CM1 and 
Client agreed that:
 CM1 could, as agent, charge Client’s 
margin to CCP, such that Client is 
principal in respect of the margin; or
 CM would take security from Client 
and then re-grant security over the 
margin to CCP.
In the former case one would expect 
that on porting the margin would simply 
follow the Client to CM3, and indeed LCH’s 
Default Rules appear to envisage precisely 
this. Rule 8.3 provides that on porting the 
collateral related to the relevant contracts 
to be ported will be identified, the collateral 
balance of CM1 will be reduced accordingly, 
and the collateral balance of CM3 will be 
increased in an equivalent amount.12
As to the latter case (CM1 re-grants 
collateral), CCP’s security interest is 
required to rank prior to that of CM1. 
Thus in the second case it is possible that 
CCP could enforce against the margin 
granted by Client to CM1, and indeed 
LCH’s Procedures (not the Default Rules) 
envisage this:
“The Clearing House gives no undertaking 
that, on the default of a Clearing Member, 
it will not utilize Clearing Clients’ 
Collateral which has been transferred to it 
by a Clearing Member, before utilising any 
other form of Collateral the Clearing  
House may hold.”13
This suggests a possible conflict between 
the porting provisions of the Default Rules 
and the collateral Procedures. One would 
expect however that the specific rules of 
porting would override the general principle 
that CCP can realize the re-granted client 
margin. In such case CCP would enforce its 
security against CM1 purely for the purpose 
of enabling a transfer of the collateral 
balance to CM3.
PORTING AND CREDIT EVENTS
As mentioned above, on CM1’s default, and 
certainly by resolution, we should expect 
that Client’s swaps will be ported to a CM3. 
This is certainly the expectation of EMIR, 
but what if the swap terminates on porting? 
More particularly, would the porting of 
CM1’s rights (ie assets) to another entity 
constitute a Credit Event Upon Merger 
under cl 5(b)(v)(1) ISDA 2002 Master 
Agreement? The relevant subclause defines 
such an event inter alia as:
“X consolidates or amalgamates with, 
or merges with or into, or transfers all 
or substantially all of its assets (or any 
substantial part of the assets comprising 
the business conducted by X as of the 
date of this MA) to, or reorganises, 
reincorporates or reconstitutes into or as, 
another entity.”
Given the way that Client’s swap has been 
“dropped-in” to the CM-CCP structure 
it would not be unlikely that the swap 
relationship through CM1 could constitute 
a significant part of Client’s business with 
CM1. Now it seems that in the case of 
porting only the “transfer” of relevant assets 
could be considered relevant. Given that 
porting may be effected either by novation 
or legal assignment it is difficult to see how 
porting would not constitute “transfer”. 
It seems then that we must look to the 
context of this subclause to help us read it 
appropriately. First, one could argue that 
in the case of porting it is not CM1 that is 
transferring anything – this is entirely an 
act of the CCP.14 On a literal reading of 
the text then, porting is not a Credit Event 
Upon Merger. Additionally one could argue 
that the subclause envisages something far 
more significant – a scheme of arrangement 
or other restructuring other than mere 
porting. On balance then it would seem 
that porting will not constitute a Credit 
Event at all and so the swap would not be 
capable of termination on this ground.
One subtle point arises with respect 
to the infamous cl 2(a)(iii) ISDA Master 
and the English courts’ interpretation 
thereof. If an Event of Default has 
occurred and is continuing, then the 
innocent party need not make payment on a 
given payment date. Consider this scenario: 
a payment date (the PD) occurs but CM1 
is in default; Client elects not to make 
payment. Client’s swap is ported on PD+1 
to CM3. Is Client then obliged to make the 
missing payment to CM3. Following Lomas 
v JFB Firth Rixson,15 it would seem not, or at 
least, not yet. 
The Court of Appeal has held that 
there exists a difference between a payment 
obligation and a debt obligation. Where  
cl 2(a)(iii) is engaged the payment 
obligation on PD may lapse, but the 
underlying debt to the counterparty 
subsists and can become due at a later  
time. This leaves several questions in 
the case of porting, designed as it is to 
continue, not close-out, the swap:
 When does Client’s subsisting debt 
obligation become due?
 If CM1 has failed to make its 
corresponding payments on PD, that 
payment obligation has not fallen away 
but is “live”. Has CM3 taken up this 
obligation on porting? 
 Consequently, must CM3  pay the gross 
amounts (ie without netting Client’s 
withheld payment) to Client?
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From CM3’s perspective, leaving the 
problematic payments of PD with CM1 
in resolution would be desirable, but this 
somewhat defeats the market continuity 
object of porting. A layer of complexity is 
added when you consider that the ultimate 
counterparty for Client (CM2 ) is two steps 
away from the port. CM2  has not defaulted 
and so will want to ensure that Client does 
not withhold payment insofar as payment 
should eventually reach CM2. What then if 
CM3  receives the port and:
(i) (by acquiescence) accepts Client’s cl 2(a)
(iii) non-payment; and/or 
(ii) refuses to take-on the defaulting CM1’s 
payment obligation? 
Do CM3 and CCP owe some duty to 
CM2 to port in a way that best preserves 
the expected economic outcome? Given the 
sums involved one would expect the point 
to be litigated.
Turning to other possibly relevant 
Credit Events, it should be noted that the 
Governmental Intervention Credit Event 
is unlikely to be applicable here. There 
relevant events concern the Reference 
Entity of a Credit Default Swap and 
unless a certain degree of convolution has 
occurred, we do not expect CM1 to also be 
the Reference Entity of such a swap.
CONCLUSION
In broad terms the development of 
mandatory CCP clearing in the EU 
provides a clear response to the FSB’s 
Guidance – many of the FSB’s concerns 
about ensuring continuity for clients and 
quarantines for CMs under resolution 
are met by the CCP-CM structure 
itself (eg margin, porting). Lacunae and 
contradictions remain in the drafting 
of the relevant regulations, problems 
exacerbated by the UK’s implementation 
and case law. One of the reasons for 
concentration of financial risk in the 
CCP-CM structure however is also to 
concentrate legal risk and to ensure 
that debates on matters such as netting 
and secured liabilities carve-outs are 
undertaken close to key infrastructure 
nodes and do not become grounds for 
judicial review for a multitude of small 
financial institutions. Further clarification 
and amendment would nevertheless be 
prudent, lest the various pressures that 
have caused such inconsistences as remain 
cause these regulations, like Duncan’s 
horses, to turn and eat each other.  n
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